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THE UNCLEARLY ESTABLISHED RULE
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES
Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wilson v. Layne,' the Supreme Court unanimously held
that law enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment
when they allow members of the media to accompany them into
a private home during the execution of a search warrant. The
Court declared that such actions on the part of law enforcement
officers are unreasonable.2 Nevertheless, the Court held that
the officers in Layne were entitled to a defense of qualified im-
munity because the violated right was not "clearly established" at
the time of the violation! According to the Court, a reasonable
law enforcement officer could have believed, at the time of the
violation, that she was not violating any law by allowing the me-
dia into a private home during the execution of a warrant
This Note argues that the Supreme Court correctly held
that federal and state law enforcement officers violated the
Fourth Amendment when they allowed two members of the
media to accompany them into the petitioners' home. This in-
trusion upon the petitioners' privacy was unreasonable because
the media presence went beyond the clearly stated bounds of
the warrant.' This Note also argues, however, that the Court er-
roneously held that the law enforcement officers in Layne were
entitled to a defense of qualified immunity. The law was
"clearly established" at the time of the violation such that a rea-
sonable officer should have known that the actions at issue in
'119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999).
'1& at 1699.





this case would constitute a violation of the well-established
principles of the Fourth Amendment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: NO UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 6
The protection guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment is
much older than the Amendment itself and is rooted in the
common law of England . Semayne's Case, perhaps the most
cited English case in this context, is famous for the statement
that "the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress,
as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his re-
pose."8 This sentiment is echoed in subsequent English cases9 as
well as in William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of Eng-
land.10 While the Supreme Court has never held that the Fourth
Amendment protects a zone of privacy generally, it has made
clear in a long line of cases that one of the central purposes of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect a zone of privacy within
the home from unwarranted and unreasonable government in-
trusion. To hold that there has been a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, a court must find that there was government ac-
tion,12 that there was in fact a search or seizure, and that the
6 U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
7 Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1697.
8 Semayne v. Gresham, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (1604).
See, eg., Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
0 WILLIAM BLACESTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 223 (1765-
1769).
" See, ag., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961).
2 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921)
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search or seizure was unreasonable. 4 As the first two elements
are not at issue in this case, this Note will focus on the third re-
quirement.
A search or seizure can be unreasonable in a number of
ways, with perhaps the most obvious being a warrantless search
without probable cause." Even with a warrant, however, a
search can still be unreasonable. In Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,16 the Supreme
Court stated in a footnote that the Fourth Amendment requires
that an officer executing a search warrant stay strictly within the
bounds set by the warrant.1 7 Five years later in Andresen v. Mary-
land,'8 the Court warned that responsible officials must assure
that searches and seizures "are conducted in a manner that
minimizes unwarranted intrusions into privacy."'9  Thus, the
Court began to make clear the proposition that a warrant alone
would not suffice to make an intrusion into the privacy of a
home reasonable. In Arizona v. Hicks,2° the Court held that po-
lice actions in the execution of a warrant must be related to the
objectives of the authorized intrusion.2' Similarly, in Horton v.
California,22 the Court held that "[i]f the scope of the search ex-
ceeds that permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant or
the character of the relevant exception from the warrant re-
quirement, the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without
more."
23
Thus, unless otherwise specified by the warrant, police offi-
cers may not allow third parties to enter a home if the officers
,3 See Michael N. Levy, Comment, The Price of Fame: Should Law Enforcement Officers
Who Permit Camera Crews to Film the Execution of a Warrant in a Private Home Be Held Li-
able for Civil Damages?, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1153, 1165-67 (1998).
" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768
(1966).
" WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3(b), at 140 (2d
ed. 1992). ("The probable cause test... is an objective one; for there to be probable
cause, the facts must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonable man.").
,6 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
,7 id. at 394 n.7.
"427 U.S. 463 (1976).
I91d. at 482 n.11.
480 U.S. 321 (1987).
2' Id. at 325.




do not need third-party assistance.24 Such an action would be
unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion and
would therefore be in violation of the Fourth Amendment.2s In
Bills v. Aseltine,26 which was decided only five weeks before the
events at issue in Layne occurred, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that law enforcement officers violated the
Fourth Amendment when they allowed a security guard to enter
the plaintiff's home to perform a search that was not authorized
by the search warrant. The warrant at issue authorized a search
for narcotics only and the security guard was not present for the
purposes of aiding in this search. Significantly, the holding in
Bills finds support in a federal statute which details the persons
authorized to serve a search warrant. That statute, under the
heading "Persons authorized to serve search warrant," provides:
A search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the officers
mentioned in its direction or by an officer authorized by law to serve
such warrant, but by no other person, except in aid of the officer on his
requiring it, he being present and acting in its execution. 2
Thus, the presence of the security guard violated the Fourth
Amendment because the purpose of his presence was not to aid
the officers.0
B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY GENERALLY
Once a person's rights under the Fourth Amendment have
been violated, the next step for a court is to determine the rem-
edy."' In most cases, the person whose right is violated is a
criminal defendant and the remedy is typically brought about
through the use of the exclusionary rule. In a civil case, how-
ever, in which a plaintiff brings an action against government
2'4 Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992).
' Id.; see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S.
321 (1987).
2958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992).
27.
21 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994).
29id.
32 L; see also Bills, 958 F.2d at 697.
3, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 391-92 (1971).
22 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence seized in violation
of the Constitution is inadmissible in court).
[Vol. 90
WILSON v. LAYNE
actors for violation of her Fourth Amendment right against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, the remedy obviously must be
quite different. In such cases, the admissibility of evidence is
not an issue.3" The codification of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a federal cause of action against state
actors who have violated federal law,3 4 while Bivens creates an
analogous cause of action against federal actors.3 In Layne, pe-
titioners sought damages from state respondents under § 1983
and from federal respondents under Bivens.6 Petitioners were
not seeking to challenge the admissibility of any evidence.
Rather, they were seeking redress in the form of monetary dam-
ages for the invasion of their privacy.
Defendants in a § 1983 or a Bivens action are, however, enti-
fled to a defense of qualified immunity if the allegedly violated
right was not "clearly established" at the time of the violation.
The first recognition by the Supreme Court of this right of
qualified immunity for ordinary government employees came in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald.' The Court held that government officials
performing discretionary functions are "shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
'clearly established' statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."39 The Court further re-
fined this standard five years later in Anderson v. Creighton,° a
case in which a homeowner brought an action against an FBI
" Plantiffs in such cases do not seek the exclusion of evidence because there is
usually no evidence to be excluded. A search can be unreasonable even if it does not
result in the production of incriminating evidence.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388.
36 SeeWilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1696 (1999).
17 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
T Levy, supra note 13, at 1171 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813).
" See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (plaintiff filed suit against presidential aides alleging
the existence of a conspiracy to discharge plaintiff unlawfully from employment in
the Department of Air Force).
'0 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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agent because of a warrantless search. The Court held that a
defense of qualified immunity will fail if the right allegedly vio-
lated was "clearly established" at the time of the violation such
that a reasonable official could have believed that her actions
were within the bounds of the law.41 However, the Court added:
"[t]his is not to say that an official action is protected by quali-
fied immunity unless the very act in question has been previ-
ously held unlawful, but it is to say that in light of preexisting
authority the unlawfulness must be apparent."")4 This holding
was reinforced in United States v. Laner in which the Court ex-
plained that the qualified immunity test is essentially the same
as the "fair warning" test in criminal proceedings." The pur-
pose of the defense is to give the defendant fair warning that his
action will result in liability.4 5  However, the Court also ex-
plained that fair warning does not necessarily require that a fac-
tually indistinguishable case must have already come before the
adjudicating court. 6 According to the Court, a right that has
been defined in general terms can still clearly establish the law. 7
C. QUALIFIED IMMUNIY IN THE CONTEXT OF MEDIA ENTRY INTO
HOMES
Only three federal appellate court cases prior to Layne dealt
with the question of qualified immunity in the context of media
entry into private homes during the execution of a warrant."' In
the first case, Ayeni v. Mottola, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held that an objectively reasonable officer could not
have concluded that inviting a television crew to participate in
41 Id- at 638.
2Id at 640.
43520 U.S. 259 (1997).
" Id. at 265. The "fair warning" test in criminal proceedings requires that courts






's Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th
Cir. 1996); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court denied
certiorari to review the holdings of Parker and Ayeni, but granted certiorari to review
the holding of Berger. In Hanlon v. Berger, 119 S. Ct. 1706 (1999), which was decided
the same day as Layne, the Supreme Court held that the officers in Hanlon were not




the search of a home was lawful and that any officer engaging in
such conduct was not entitled to qualified immunity. In Ayeni,
law enforcement officers entered the apartment of the plaintiff
to search for specified evidence of credit card fraud pursuant to
a warrant 0 In doing so, the officers permitted a CBS television
crew from "Street Stories," a weekly news magazine program, to
enter the home and videotape the search.51 The court of ap-
peals emphasized the importance of the privacy right protected
by the Fourth Amendment and held that "clearly established"
law prohibited the conduct of the officers."2 The court ex-
plained that the absence of a prior case that answered the pre-
cise question at issue in Ayeni did not necessitate the conclusion
that the violated right was not "clearly established. 5 3 In the sec-
ond case, Parker v. Boyer,54 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in a case involving the
entry of a television news crew into a private home during a
search for weapons. 5 The court of appeals emphasized that the
absence of caselaw precluded a finding that the law was "clearly
established" at the time of the violation. The court added that
most courts had rejected the argument that a constitutional
right is violated when the media enter a home during a search.
5 7
Finally, in Berger v. Hanlo-58 which involved similar factual cir-
cumstances, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the law against media entry into homes during the execu-
tion of a warrant was "clearly established" and that officers vio-
lating this right were not entitled to qualified immunity.9
Turning more specifically to the facts involved in Layne, the
parties to the case were able to cite only three cases prior to
April 1992, which involved the permissibility of media entry into
" Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 686.
50 id. at 683.
5 1Id.
12 Id. at 686.
53 Id.
93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996).
"Id. at 447.
'Id
'8 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997).
'9 Id. at 511-12.
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homes during the execution of a search warrant.60 Two of the
cases were unpublished and the district courts in each case held
that media entry into a home was permissible. However, nei-
ther case involved a discussion of the Fourth Amendment ques-
tion at issue in Layne.6 ' The only published decision on point
arose out of a state intermediate appellate court which held that
members of a news crew did not violate plaintiff's constitutional
rights when they entered his home during the execution of a
search warrant.6 However, the court also held that the law en-
forcement officers who permitted the news crew to enter plain-
tiff's home were guilty of trespass.6
Thus, at the time of the alleged violation in Layne, no prior
case had dealt with the same set of factual circumstances in-
volved in Layne. 4 However, the prior caselaw did demonstrate
that the Fourth Amendment prohibited police actions unre-
lated to the objective of a warrant.6
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In early 1992, the United States Marshals Service established
"Operation Gunsmoke," ("Gunsmoke") a nationwide fugitive
apprehension program operated in conjunction with state and
local law enforcement agencies.6 This nationwide program,
created to apprehend dangerous criminals, resulted in 3,313 ar-
rests in 40 metropolitan areas.67 Pursuant to the program, the
Marshals Service entered into a Memorandum of Understand-
' Moncriefv. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rptr. 1620 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Higbee v. Times-
Advocate, 5 Media L. Rptr. 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768
(Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
6 Moncrief, 10 Media L. Rptr. at 1620; Higbee, 5 Media L. Rptr. at 2372.
62 Prah4 295 N.W.2d at 768.63 Id. at 782.
6 Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1700 (1999).
6' Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
6' Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1695.




ing with the Montgomery County (Md.) Sheriff's Office on Feb-
ruary 12, 1992. 8
One of the targets of the program was Dominic Jerome Wil-
son, the son of petitioners Charles and Geraldine Wilson.69
Dominic Wilson had violated his probation on previous convic-
tions of robbery, theft, and assault with intent to rob and was
considered by the program's standards to be a violent offender
likely to resist arrest.70 On April 14, 1992, the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, Maryland issued three bench warrants for
the arrest of Dominic Wilson, one for each of his probation vio-
lations.7' Each of the warrants was addressed to "any duly
authorized peace officer" and was identical aside from mention
of the specific probation violation at issue.2 None of the war-
rants made any mention of media presence or participation.73
However, the Marshals Service had earlier adopted a written
media "ride-along" policy which contemplated media presence
in homes during the execution of a warrant.74 The policy had
been prepared by an employee in the public relations office of
the Marshals Service.7
Early in the morning of April 16, 1992, Gunsmoke officials
assembled a team of United States Marshals and Montgomery
County Police officers to raid the home of petitioners in search
of Dominic Wilson.76 The respondent deputy, U.S. Marshal
'Brief for Petitioners at 2, Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999) (No. 98-83).
The Memorandum stated: "It is agreed that no mention will be made to the press
about 'Operation Gunsmoke' until a joint press statement can be prepared at the
culmination of the operation." Id.
'9 Federal Respondents' Brief at 2, Layne (No. 98-83).
70 id
7, Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1695.
72 Id. at 1695 n.1. For example, one of the warrants read:
The State of Maryland, to any duly authorized peace officer, greeting: you are hereby
commanded to take Dominic Jerome Wilson if he/she shall be found in your bailiwick,
and have him immediately before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, now in ses-
sion, at the Judicial Center, in Rockville, to answer an indictment, or information, or
criminal appeals unto the State of Maryland, of and concerning a certain charge of Rob-
bery [Violation of Probation] by him committed, as hath been presented, and so forth.
Hereof fail not at your peril, and have you then and there this writ. Witness.
Id.
7 Id. at 1695.
7' Federal Respondents' Brief at 2, Layne (No. 98-83).
75 Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1704.
7' Petitioners' Brief at 2, Layne (No. 98-83).
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Harry Layne, the Washington, D.C. area site supervisor of Gun-
smoke, assigned a reporter and photographer from the Wash-
ington Post to accompany the Gunsmoke team.77 Marc Wilson,
Dominic Wilson's brother, had informed the law enforcement
officers that Dominic Wilson resided with their parents at 909
North Stone Street Avenue in the Lincoln Park neighborhood
of Rockville. 78 Thus, at approximately 6:45 A.M., the Gunsmoke
team, accompanied by the reporter and photogragher from the
Washington Post, raided the home at that address.
Charles and Geraldine Wilson, the petitioners, were lying in
bed when they heard a loud knocking on their front door."' Va-
lencia Snowden, their nine year-old granddaughter, answered
the door and was promptly removed by the officers to a safe lo-
cation.81 Mr. Wilson called out to Valencia." When she did not
respond, Mr. Wilson got out of bed and walked into the living
room where he was confronted by three gun-wielding, plain
clothes law enforcement officers accompanied by the reporter
and photographer from the Washington Post.83  Mr. Wilson,
who was wearing only his underpants, repeatedly cursed the of-
ficers and demanded that they explain their presence.8 ' He
raised his hands in the air and was quickly ordered to the
ground by the officers."' Mrs. Wilson, who was wearing only a
sheer nightgown, entered the room to find her husband face-
down on the floor with a police officer's knee in his back and a
gun to his head.8 In response to the officers' questions about
the whereabouts of Dominic Wilson, Mr. Wilson told the offi-
cers that he was not Dominic, that Dominic did not live there,
and that he had not seen Dominic for at least two weeks. 7 Mrs.
'7 Id The record does not make clear the reason for this assignment.
78 Federal Respondents' Brief at 3, Layne (No. 98-83); Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1696.
Petitioners' Brief at 3, Layne (No. 98-83).
so Id.
8' Federal Respondents' Brief at 3, Layne (No. 98-83); Petitioners' Brief at 3, Layne
(No. 98-83).
'2 Petitioners' Brief at 3, Layne (No. 98-83).
'Id at 3-4.
Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1696.
Petitioners' Brief at 4, Layne (No. 98-83).
86 Id at 4-5.
87 Id at 4. Mr. Wilson was visibly angry throughout the encounter and repeatedly
cursed at the officers.
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Wilson confirmed Mr. Wilson's statements. 88 The reporter and
photographer, who took several pictures of the Wilsons, were
present in the Wilsons' home during the entire encounter with-
out their consent.89 The District Court found that the reporters
"were in the house, snooping around, looking around, partici-
pating in one fashion or another with both the search of the
premises for the individual, who was not found, and the seizure
of the Wilsons, who were detained and actually photographed
by the photographer."9 After determining that Dominic Wilson
was not in petitioners' home, the officers left with the reporter
and photographer. 91 At no point during the encounter were the
Wilsons permitted to clothe themselves decently. 2 None of the
pictures were ever published by the Washington Post.
93
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioners brought a lawsuit in the District Court of Mary-
land against the federal law enforcement officers in their per-
sonal capacities under Bivens,94 and against the state law
enforcement officers in their personal capacities under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.95 Petitioners claimed that their rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments96 were violated because
the officers (1) used excessive force; (2) lacked probable cause
to believe that Dominic Wilson would be present at petitioners'
address; and (3) allowed members of the media into their home
during the execution of the warrants.97 The district court
granted summary judgment to the respondents on the first two
points because the evidence, "when viewed in the light most fa-
vorable to petitioners," demonstrated that the amount of force
used was reasonable and that the officers had probable cause to
believe that Dominic Wilson would be found in petitioners'
" Id.
" Id. at 5.
Id. at 4-5.
"' Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1696.
Petitioners' Brief at 5, Layne (No. 98-83).
"Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1696.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
9- Layne, 119 S.Ct. at 1696.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV provides: "No State shall... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law...."
17 Federal Respondents' Brief at 4, Layne (No. 98-83).
2000]
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home.98 The court, however, ruled in petitioners' favor on the
third point holding that the actions of the officers in allowing
members of the media into the petitioners' home during the
execution of a warrant violated petitioners' Fourth Amendment
right." Further, the court denied respondents' motion for
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds because, ac-
cording to the court, at the time of violation in April 1992, the
violated Fourth Amendment right was "clearly established.'1'0
The district court argued that the "core constitutional right"
had been "clearly established" despite the absence of a prior
factually indistinguishable case.10'
The respondents brought an interlocutory appeal and, in a
2 to 1 decision, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment
for the respondents. The court held that the officers were enti-
fled to a defense of qualified immunity because a reasonable of-
ficer could have believed she was not violating any "clearly
established" right.02 The court held that the few cases dealing
with the subject precluded a finding that the law was "clearly es-
tablished."'0 The court, however, declined to decide whether
the officers' actions actually constituted a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
0 4
The court of appeals granted petitioners' motion for re-
hearing before an en banc court and reversed the district court
in a 6 to 5 decision.105 Once again the court declined to decide
whether there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment but
held that the officers were nonetheless entitled to qualified im-
munity because the officers did not violate any "clearly estab-
lished" right of petitioners.'0 The majority found that even if it
was "clearly established" in April 1992, that the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibited unwarranted third party entry into homes, it
could not conclude that the actions of the officers in this case
98Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 113 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Id. at 113-14.
' 0 M at 114.
'0' Petitioners' Brief at 63a-64a, Layne (No. 98-83).
' Wilson v. Layne, 110 F.3d 1071, 1074-76 (4th Cir. 1997).
03 l& at 1074.
'0I4. at 1075-76.
5 Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
"' Id at 118-19
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would fall under such a rule. °7 The dissenting opinion, agree-
ing with the district court, argued that respondents were not en-
titled to qualified immunity because it had long been "clearly
established" that the actions of police officers in the execution
of a warrant are strictly limited by the bounds set by the war-
rant.0 8 Furthermore, the dissenting opinion argued that any
reasonable officer should have known that the actions at issue in
this case would constitute a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.'9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the court of ap-
peals on November 9, 1998, limited to the following two ques-
tions: "1. Whether law enforcement officers violate the Fourth
Amendment by allowing members of the news media to accom-
pany them and to observe and record their execution of a war-
rant? 2. Whether, if this action violates the Fourth Amendment,
the officers are nonetheless entitled to defense of qualified im-
munity?""0
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and
argued in Part II of his opinion that respondents violated the
Fourth Amendment when they allowed members of the media
to accompany them into petitioners' home during the execu-
tion of a warrant."' ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued in Part III of
his opinion that the officers in this case were nonetheless enti-
tled to a defense of qualified immunity because the state of the
law on this issue was not "clearly established" in April 1992,
when the violation took place." In Part II of the opinion, the
Court began by determining that the qualified immunity analy-
sis is identical under either a § 1983 or a Bivens cause of ac-
107 Id. at 115-16.
"' Id. at 119-20 (Murnaghan,J., dissenting).
Id. at 120 (Murnaghan,J., dissenting).
,Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998).
.Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1698-99 (1999). Part II of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion was joined by the other eightJustices.
12 Id at 1699-1701. Part HI of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by
ScaliaJ., O'ConnorJ., Ginsburg,J., SouterJ., Thomas,J., KennedyJ, and BreyerJ.
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tion."8 In order to evaluate a defense of qualified immunity, a
court must first determine the existence of a constitutional vio-
lation, and then proceed to determine whether the violated
constitutional right was "clearly established" at the time of the
alleged violation.1 4 The purpose of this order of procedure is to
"spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwar-
ranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a
long drawn-out lawsuit."'15 Another benefit of this order is that
it "promotes clarity in the legal standards of both the officers
and the general public.11 6
Thus, the Court first determined whether there had in fact
been a violation of the Fourth Amendment.17  Chief Justice
Rehnquist began with a discussion of the "centuries-old princi-
ple of respect for the privacy of the home" which was recog-
nized in England long before the founding of the nation and
which was the basis for the Fourth Amendment."8 This respect
for the sanctity of the home entailed the principle that police
cannot enter a home without a warrant. Furthermore, the
scope of the search must not exceed the bounds set by the war-
rant.' Although this does not mean that every police action
must be explicitly authorized by the warrant, 'it does mean that
every police action must be related to the objectives that justi-
fied the issuance of the warrant.
22
The Court then held that the presence of the reporter and
photographer in the home of petitioners "was not related to the
objectives of the authorized intrusion" and was therefore in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment.'2 Respondents admitted that
the reporters did not assist the police in the execution of the
warrant and that the objectives of the intrusion did not necessi-
,' Id. at 1696-97 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 n.9 (1989); Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 n.2 (1986)).
"4 1 d at 1697.
"' Id. (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)).




19 Id (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603-04 (1980)).
'20 Id. (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990)).
1 Id. at 1697-98 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981)).
2 Id. at 1698 (citingArizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)).
12 Id. at 1698.
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tate their presence. 24 However, respondents argued that the
presence of the reporters in petitioners' home served various
important law enforcement purposes.'2 Respondents argued
first, that the police should have reasonable discretion to de-
,126termine the appropriateness of media "ride-alongs." Second,
respondents claimed that media presence helps keep the public
in touch with police activities. 2' Finally, respondents asserted
that media presence could help protect the safety of both
homeowners and the police.128 The Court discussed and dis-
missed each of these arguments9
First, respondents argued that law enforcement officers
should be permitted to exercise reasonable discretion in deter-
mining when it would "further their law enforcement mission to
permit members of the news media to accompany them in exe-
cuting a warrant.', 3 0 The Court rejected this claim because it
"ignor[ed] the importance of the right of residential privacy"
3'
and because it failed to appreciate the distinction between law
enforcement objectives generally and the more specific objec-
tives of a search132 The Court stated that whether or not media
"ride-alongs" further law enforcement objectives generally, it
does not follow that they also further the specific objectives of
an authorized intrusion into a private home.33
Second, the respondents claimed that media presence dur-
ing the execution of a warrant helps publicize government ef-
forts to combat crime and promotes accurate reporting of
police activities.'3 Although the Court noted that some of its
First Amendment opinions acknowledge the importance of




'2 I& at 1699.
129 
Id.





Id (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975); Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980)).
2000]
SUPREME COURT REViEW
good public relations is simply not enough, standing alone, to
justify the 'ride-along' intrusion into a private home.""6
Finally, respondents asserted that the presence of the media
could help protect the safety of both homeowners and police of-
ficers because all parties involved would be hesitant to misbe-
have in front of the camera. 3 7 The Court, however, dismissed
this argument because the reporters from the Washington Post
were not invited to serve these purposes." The reporters were
present for their own private purposes only.3 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist then turned to the question of
qualified immunity and explained that in order for respondents
to be liable, the violated right must have been "clearly estab-
lished" at the time of the violation:
40
"Clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity means that
"It] he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This
is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity un-
less the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it
is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be ap-paren."14
The Court further explained that the allegedly violated
right must be established at the "appropriate level of specificity
before a court can determine whether it was 'clearly estab-
lished"' at the time of the violation. According to the Court,
the question in this case was "whether a reasonable officer could
have believed that bringing members of the media into a home
during the execution of an arrest warrant was lawful, in light of
'clearly established' law and the information the officers pos-
sessed.' 4 3 Using this standard, the Court held that a reasonable
officer could have believed that the actions of the officers in this




,"7 Id at 1699.
138 rd
139 Id
140 Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
4 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
1 Id. at 1699-1700 (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641).




First, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that "the constitu-
tional question is by no means open and shut" and that "accu-
rate media coverage of police activities serves an important
public purpose." ' Thus, the Court found that the general
principles of the Fourth Amendment did not make it obvious
that the officers in this case behaved unreasonably.'
46
Second, the majority argued that at the time of the viola-
tion, the caselaw did not clearly establish that the common prac-
tice of allowing members of the media to "ride along"'1 7 violated
the Fourth Amendment. 8 The only published decision directly
on point held that such conduct was not unreasonable, 49 while
the two unpublished decisions cited by the parties upheld
searches involving media entry into homes based upon non-
Fourth Amendment analyses." The Court rejected petitioners'
reliance upon Bills v. Aseltine for the proposition that police may
not allow third parties to enter a home during the execution of
a warrant unless third party assistance is required.'5' First, Bills
was decided only five weeks before the events in Layne, and sec-
ond, Bills arose out of a different jurisdiction, and thus could
not clearly establish the question at issue here.' The Court
then pointed out that petitioners had neither cited any control-
ling authority in their jurisdiction, nor identified a consensus of
persuasive authority sufficient to show that the violated law in
this case was "clearly established" in April 1992 .
Finally, the majority emphasized the importance of the reli-
ance by the United States Marshals on the media "ride-along
policy which explicitly contemplated that media who engaged in
ride-alongs might enter private homes with their cameras as part
of fugitive apprehension arrests."'54 According to the Court, in
light of the fact that the caselaw on the subject was unclear, it
145 id,
146 d
,4 Id. (citing Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1976)).
148 Id.
9 Id. (citing Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 782 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)).
15o Id. (citing Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rptr. 1620 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Hig-
bee v. Times-Advocate, 5 Media L. Rptr. 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980)).






was reasonable for officers to rely upon their media "ride-along"
policy.
55
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT
Justice Stevens concurred with the majority that the officers
violated the Fourth Amendment in bringing the reporters from
the Washington Post into petitioners' home.56 However, he dis-
sented from the majority holding that the officers in this case
were entitled to a defense of qualified immunity on the grounds
that the violated law was "clearly established" in April 1992:'57
The clarity of the constitutional rule, a federal statute (18 U.S.C. §
3105), common-law decisions, and the testimony of the senior law en-
forcement officer all support my position that it has long been clearly es-
tablished that officers may not brin third parties into private homes to
witness the execution of a warrant.
Justice Stevens pointed out that the Court's holding that the
Fourth Amendment was violated was in agreement with the
holdings of every federal appellate court judge who had ad-
dressed the same question. 5g- Thus, he asserted that any reason-
able officer should have known that the actions involved in this
case violated "clearly established" law.1W He went on to argue
that the absence of judicial opinions expressly holding that the
actions of the respondents violated the Fourth Amendment did
not show that the law was not "clearly established.', 6' According
to Justice Stevens, "[t]he easiest cases don't even arise.' ' 62 Fur-
thermore, while the practice of media "ride-alongs" may have
been common, Justice Stevens pointed out that this did not
mean that the practice of allowing third parties into homes dur-
ing the execution of a warrant was common. 63 The case cited
by the majority involved the practice of firefighters allowing
"'Id at 1701.
516 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). No other Justices
joined in the opinion.
157 I& (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"8 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9 Id. at 1702 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"0 I& (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162 Id. at 1701 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)).
'
6
3 Id. at 1702 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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photographers into disaster areas and involved the doctrine of
implied consent, a doctrine inapplicable to this case.'64
Justice Stevens next claimed that the three main cases dis-
cussed by the majority could not support its holding.10 The two
federal decisions did not even address the Fourth Amendment
question and were, moreover, unpublished.'r Furthermore, al-
though the one published decision held that the media's ac-
tions in filming and broadcasting a reasonable search and
seizure were not unreasonable, Justice Stevens emphasized that
the court also held that the officers in that case committed a
trespass by allowing third parties to enter the plaintiff's home. 67
As further support for his argument that a reasonable offi-
cer should have known that the law violated in this case was
"clearly established," Justice Stevens pointed to the understand-
ing of the police themselves.'6 The Sheriff of Montgomery
County, the commanding officer of three of the respondents
stated: 'We would never let a civilian into a home .... That's
just not allowed.' 69
Finally, Justice Stevens strongly criticized the majority's reli-
ance upon the media "ride-along" policy.' 9 The policy con-
tained very little direction in how and when members of the
media may enter a private home and "[t]he notion that any
member of that well-trained cadre of professionals would rely
on such a document for guidance in the performance of dan-
gerous law enforcement assignments is too farfetched to merit
serious consideration. According to Justice Stevens, the pol-
icy was intended to serve as propaganda to bolster the image of
'I& at 1702-03 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1976)). The doctrine of im-
plied consent is based on the premise that consent can be presumed in the presence
of certain circumstances, even if explicit verbal or written consent is absent. BLACK'S
LAw DIcTIONARY 305 (6th ed. 1990).
"6 Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1703 (StevensJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"6 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17Id. at 1703 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 782 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)).
"8 Id at 1704 (Stevens,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"9 Id (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Petitioners'
Brief at 41, Layne (No. 98-83)).
'
70 I& at 1704 (Stevens,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171 Id (Stevens,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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law enforcement, and not as a guide for the conduct of police
officers.72
V. ANALYSIS
A. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS VIOLATED THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court correctly concluded that the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures prohibits law enforcement officers from allowing the
media to enter a home during the execution of a search war-
rant.173 The unanimous opinion, authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, properly emphasized that the notion of the home as
a person's castle, the one sure place to which a person may re-
treat from the outside world, has been an important part of the
American legal tradition since the founding of the nation.7 4
The Fourth Amendment was written in order to preserve the
overriding importance of the privacy of the home' 7 and the Su-
preme Court has expounded upon the importance of the
Fourth Amendment and the sanctity of the home in countless
opinions.176 Layne should therefore, be analyzed within this con-
text and tradition.
Although the Court has never previously decided a case in-
volving media entry into homes during the execution of a war-
rant, it has clearly held in several cases that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits officers executing a warrant from per-
forming actions unrelated to the objectives of the warrant.1
77
Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. § 3105 permits execution of a search
warrant only by authorized officers or any person required to
aid the authorized officers. 17 In Layne, the law enforcement of-
7I2& (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"Id at 1699.
74 Id. at 1697.
175 Id.
171 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297 (1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961).
,77 See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
178 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994).
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ficers admitted that the reporter and photographer from the
Washington Post were not present in the petitioners' home to
aid the officers and did not participate in the execution of the
warrant. 7 The three arguments of respondents regarding the
benefits of media involvement are too general to be taken seri-
ously in this context.'s While media presence during the execu-
tion of a search warrant may serve certain important functions,
assistin police in the execution of a warrant is not among
them.8 Also, the three warrants made no mention of media in-
volvement. 1 2 Thus, by permitting the media to enter petition-
ers' home, the officers were performing actions unrelated to the
objectives of the authorized intrusion.18
One of the most important functions served by a warrant is
to ensure that an intrusion into a private home is strictly neces-
sary.' Thus, warrants not only specify who may perform the
search, but also what area may be searched, and what may be
searched for.'8 This function, however, is undermined when of-
ficers stray outside the boundaries set by the warrant by per-
forming actions unrelated to the objectives of the authorized
intrusion.'w The Fourth Amendment protection is weakened if
police are not bound by the terms of the warrant.8 7 One need
not look any further than the case at issue for a specific example
of the kind of harm likely to result from police action unauthor-
ized by a warrant.'8 As if the encounter was not humiliating
enough, the Wilsons were forced to submit to the presence of
two additional strangers in their living room.8 9 One of these
strangers was busy scribbling notes while the other was snapping
photographs of the half-naked couple.r ° If the Fourth Amend-
"7 Petitioners' Brief at 5, Layne (No. 98-83).
" Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1698-99.
1'1 d.
,12 Petitioners' Brief at 3, Layne (No. 98-83).
'Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1698-99.
"* LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 3.3(a), at 138.
'&d § 3.4(e)-(f); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994).
"Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
,' Horton, 496 U.S. 128; Hicks, 480 U.S. 321; Bivens, 403 U.S. 388.
'" Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692.




ment truly protects the privacy of the home and prohibits war-
rantless police action, it is difficult to imagine circumstances
more in violation of the amendment than what occurred in the
Wilson home.'91
The unanimous Court correctly dismissed respondents' ar-
guments that media presence during the execution of a warrant
serves a number of important and socially valuable purposes. 2
The determination of whether police violated the Fourth
Amendment while executing a warrant does not turn on
whether or not the police actions were beneficial . 3 Rather, a
court must look to the relevant caselaw and to the general prin-
ciples of the Fourth Amendment.94 In this instance, both dem-
onstrate that regardless of the benefits of media presence, the
Fourth Amendment simply does not permit police actions unre-
lated to the objectives of the warrant.' Because the actions of
the officers in Layne were unrelated to the objectives of the war-
rant, the Supreme Court was correct in holding that they vio-
lated petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights.' 96
Despite the concerns of fans of police-drama television
shows (e.g., Cops and L.A.P.D.), such shows will most likely not
be affected by the Court's ruling in Layne.197 According to John
Langley, executive producer of the Fox program "COPS," his
television show should remain "unaffected by the decision be-
cause we obtain releases from everyone involved in our pro-
gram. Moreover, we do not, under any circumstances, violate
rights of privacy."'9' Mr. Langley's statement is correct insofar as
it applies to the instances not involving surprise raids into pri-
vate homes.19' Receiving consent to broadcast a person's image
after the unannounced and unwarranted intrusion into a home
'9' Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1696.
' I2. at 1698-99.
193 d
194 a-
.'. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
'9 Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1699.
197Joan Biskupic & Howard Kurtz, Police Can Be Sued for Letting Media See Raids,
WASH. PoST, May 25, 1999, atA8.
18 Id.
Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1692.
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could not retroactively erase a Fourth Amendment violation.200
Regardless of whether the homeowners' image is published, po-
lice violate the Fourth Amendment when they allow members of
the media to accompany them into a private home.01
B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED
The officers in Layne were not entitled to a defense of quali-
fied immunity.2 2 In holding that the officers were entitled to
such a defense, the Court implicitly rejected important portions
of the holdings of two of its previous cases, one of which was de-
cided only two years prior to Layne. °s In both Anderson v. Creigh-
ton and United States v. Lanier, the Court held that a right can be
"clearly established" even in the absence of a prior factually in-
distinguishable case holding the conduct at issue unlawful.2 4
Although no court prior to April 1992, held that officers violate
the Fourth Amendment when they allow the media into a home
during the execution of a warrant, the Supreme Court had held
on several occasions that the actions of officers in the execution
of a warrant must be related to the objectives of the warrant.
20 °
Thus, it should have been clear to a reasonable officer in April
1992, that allowing members of the media to enter a home dur-
ing the execution of a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment
when such actions were unrelated to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion. 206 The majority improperly focused its
analysis on the scant caselaw involving media intrusion into the
home2 7 and the result was an analysis of cases that did not even
201Id In any event, according to Mr. Langley, "Most of what we show happens on
the street or in cars." Media "Ride-Alongs" Breach Privacy Rights, FACTS ON Fl WORLD
NEWS DIGEST, June 3, 1999, at 397, B3.
"2 See Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1701-04.
2" See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997); see also Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635 (1987).
Lanier, 520 U.S. at 271; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 635. See supra notes 40-46 and ac-
companying text.
"-3 Se e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
"6 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Hicks, 480 U.S. at 321; Bivens, 403
U.S. at 388.
217 See Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1700.
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address the Fourth Amendment question involved here.208 Al-
though the three cases cited by the majority did involve media
entry into homes,2° the two unpublished decisions did not cite
to a single Fourth Amendment search and seizure case while the
holding of the one published decision did not even involve the
question of police liability.210 As pointed out by the dissent, the
absence of caselaw specifically addressing the question involved
in Layne does not show that the violated right had not been
"clearly established. '21 1  The clearest cases of Fourth Amend-
ment violations typically do not need to be adjudicated.2 2 If the
Court had focused on the more general right limiting police ac-
tion to the objectives of a warrant, it would have been clear that
the officers in Layne violated this "clearly established" right.
213
By allowing members of the media to enter the Wilsons' home,
the officers performed actions completely unrelated to the ob-
214thjectives of the warrant. Thus, they should have realized that
their unauthorized actions violated the Wilsons' Fourth
Amendment rights.15
Additionally, the officers' understanding of the law is an
appropriate place to look when determining whether a reason-
able officer could have believed that the police conduct in Layne
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.2 6 The Sheriff of Mont-
gomery County, the commanding officer for three of the re-
spondents, clearly stated that third parties are never allowed
into a home. 7 A reasonable officer, therefore, could not have
See id. The two unpublished district court opinions, Moncrief v. Hanton and Hig-
bee v. Times-Advocate did not even address the Fourth Amendment. 10 Media L. Rptr.
1620 (N.D. Ohio 1984); 5 Media L. Rptr. 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980). The Fourth
Amendment issue in Prahl v. Brosamle involved a claim against the newscaster and not
against the police. 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
See supra notes 60-62, 149-50, 165-67 and accompanying text.
210 Petitioners' Brief at 42-43, Layne (No. 98-83).
21 Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1702 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21" Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
214 Horton, 496 U.S. 128; Hicks, 480 U.S. 321; Bivens, 403 U.S. 388.
215 Horton, 496 U.S. 128; Hicks, 480 U.S. 321; Bivens, 403 U.S. 388.
226 Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1704 (Stevens,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227 Petitioners' Brief at 41, Layne (No. 98-83).
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believed that the actions of the officers in Layne were permissi-
ble.
21 8
The majority, nevertheless, emphasized the significance of
the media "ride-along" policy which contemplated the presence
of the media in private homes during the execution of war-
rants.219 This emphasis, however, was misguided because testi-
mony of the respondents revealed that they were unaware of the
policy.220 Also, as argued by the dissent, the policy contained
very little direction as to how and when members of the media
may enter a private home.2' This is unsurprising in view of the
strong probability that the policy was written as a public rela-
tions tool designed to improve the image of the Marshals Serv-
ice.222 Thus, the idea that law enforcement officers would rely
upon such an undetailed policy is simply unbelievable.223 In any
event, reliance upon the media "ride-along" policy would have
directly contradicted the Memorandum of Understanding be-
tween the United States Marshals Service and the Montgomery
County (Md.) Sheriff's Office which specifically provided that
the press were not to be informed of "Operation Gunsmoke"
until its culmination.224 The Marshals Service could not have en-
tered an agreement which specifically ruled out the possibility
of media involvement if it was at the same time relying upon a
policy that contemplated media involvement.
Finally, it is important to note that two of the three federal
appellate courts that addressed the same questions before the
Court in Layne held that law enforcement officers violate the
Fourth Amendment when they allow members of the media to
enter a private home during the execution of a warrant.225 They
also held that officers violating this right are not entitled to a
defense of qualified immunity because this right has been
218 Id.
2,9Lays, 119 S. Ct. at 1700-01.
Petiioners' Brief at 45, Layne (No. 98-83).
"' Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1704 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2Id. (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2' Petitioners' Brief at 2, Layne (No. 98-83). ("The memorandum provided: 'It is
agreed that no mention will be made to the press about 'Operation Gunsmoke' until
ajoint press statement can be prepared at the culmination of the operation."').




"clearly established., 226 Both courts focused on the importance
of the Fourth Amendment's protection of the privacy of the
home and the caselaw demonstrating that police officers cannot
perform actions unrelated to the objectives of a search war-
rant.
227
The Supreme Court erroneously held that the police offi-
cers in Layne were entitled to a defense of qualified immunity.
228
At the time of the violation, "clearly established" law prohibited
police action unrelated to the objectives of a search warrant.
22
In Layne, the officers violated this "clearly established" law when
they allowed police officers to accompany them into the Wil-
sons' home.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court properly held
that law enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment
when they allow members of the media to enter a private home
during the execution of a warrant.20 The historical importance
of the Fourth Amendment's protection of the privacy of the
home and the Court's past decisions holding that law enforce-
ment officers must perform only those actions related to the ob-
jectives of an authorized intrusion commanded this 
result.23 '
However, the Court incorrectly held that the officers in
Layne were nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because,
according to the majority, the violated right was not "clearly es-
tablished" at the time of the violation. 2  First, the Court ig-
nored its previous holdings that a right can be "clearly
established" even in the absence of a prior factually indistin-
guishable case holding the conduct at issue unlawful. Second,
testimony of the respondents made apparent their knowledge
22 Ayeni, 35 F.3d 680; Berger, 129 F.3d 505.
22 Ayeni, 35 F.3d 680; Berger, 129 F.3d 505.
228 Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1692.
29 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
, Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1692.
231 Id
2 Id.
233 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997); Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
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that civilian entry into homes is simply "not allowed."2  Finally,
two of the three federal appellate courts that decided this same
question of qualified immunity came to the opposite conclusion
that the majority came to in Layne.2
Brian H. Chun
Petitioners' Brief at 41, Layne (No. 98-83).
" Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505
(9th Cir. 1997).
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